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CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS TO CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGANTS
Erwin Chemerinsk
Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez,' which is the focus for this
symposium, is an aberrational decision. Simply stated, it is aberra-
tional because a civil rights plaintiff won, which has rarely happened
in recent years in the Rehnquist Court. A year ago, in October Term
2000, the Court ruled against civil rights claims in virtually every case
in which they were presented.
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court
held that state governments cannot be sued for employment dis-
crimination in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.2 In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court ruled that there is not a pri-
vate right of action to enforce the regulations to Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which prohibits recipients of federal funds from en-
gaging in practices which have a racially discriminatory impact.3 Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams declared that the Federal Arbitration Act
requires arbitration of state law discrimination claims when there are
contractual provisions calling for arbitration of employment related
disputes. In Booth v. Churner, the Court said that the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act requires that a prisoner seeking money damages ex-
haust prison administrative remedies, even if they cannot provide
such a remedy, so long as they can offer the prisoner something of
value.5 Saucier v. Katz held that a police officer can be deemed pro-
tected by qualified immunity, even when there is a jury finding that
the officer used excessive force.'
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531 U.S. 533 (2001) (declaring unconstitutional a federal statute preventing attorneys
receiving funds from the Legal Services Corporation from bringing challenges to welfare laws).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
3 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
4 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
5 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that in a civil rights case alleging constitutionally excessive
force, the tests for qualified immunity and reasonableness are distinct and that a finding of ex-
cessive force does not preclude a finding of qualified immunity).
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Quite significantly, in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the Court made it
much more difficult for successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys'
fees.7 The Court said that a plaintiff is not deemed to "prevail" just
because his or her lawsuit is the "catalyst" for the government to
change its policy." Attorneys' fees are to be awarded only when there
is a judicial action-a judgment or consent decree-in favor of the
plaintiff.
Individually, each of these rulings is likely to be important in civil
rights litigation. Cumulatively, they are an astounding number of
anti-civil rights rulings in a single Term. Yet, it was not an aberra-
tional year. In the just-completed October Term 2001, the Court
held that Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Federal Educa-
tional Records and Privacy Act;"' that punitive damages are not avail-
able in actions under Title VI, the Rehabilitation Act, or the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act; '° that individual prisoners must exhaust
administrative remedies when complaining of the use of excessive
force by prison guards;" and that state governments cannot be sued
in federal agency proceedings. 12
I do not want to overstate this; there have been some victories for
civil rights plaintiffs, such as in Velasquez,
7 in Easley v. Cromartie,14
which made it easier for the government to use race in drawing elec-
tion districts to benefit minorities, and in Hope v. Pelzer,15 which held
that there need not be a case on point to deny a government officer
qualified immunity. But in the overwhelming majority of civil rights
cases, the Rehnquist Court rules against civil rights plaintiffs. This in
itself is an important and frequently overlooked aspect of the current
7 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
Id. at 600-02.
9 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002).
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (declaring that the exhaustion provision of Prison
Litigation Reform Act requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies before fi1-
ing action alleging use of excessive force by corrections officer).
12 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (holding that Con-
gress, by statute, may not authorize Federal Maritime Commission to adjudicate complaints
filed by private person against state-run ports as statutory provision permitting adjudication of
such complaints is barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
13 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
14 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (declaring that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that
voting district lines were drawn primarily based on race, because drawing lines primarily for
political purposes, even if they correlate with race, does not trigger strict scrutiny).
15 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002) (holding that police officers were not protected by qualified im-
mtinity when they tied a prisoner to a hitching post, because officers should have been on no-
tice that this condutct was unconstitttional even though there were no cases on point finding it
to be Lin constittional).
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Supreme Court. Because the Court has not overruled Roe v. Wade,'
its conservatism in civil rights cases is not fully appreciated.
But I want to focus on a more subtle and even more pernicious
theme of the Rehnquist Court's civil rights decisions: Velazquez is ab-
errational because it reflects respect for the importance of the judici-
ary and access to the courts. Most other recent civil rights cases show
a profound disrespect for the importance of the availability of the ju-
dicial process to injured individuals. The consistent theme that
unites the many recent civil rights decisions is how they close the
courthouse doors to those whose rights have been violated.
To be sure, closing the courthouse doors is not a new technique
for a conservative court to use to undermine rights. During the early
years of the Burger Court, it did this by expanding the scope of ab-
stention doctrines,17 and by increasing standing as a barrier to civil
rights litigation.' But the recent decisions are different in an impor-
tant respect. The Burger Court cases were primarily about channel-
ing civil rights litigation from federal to state court. The Rehnquist
Court rulings of the last few years are about precluding all judicial fo-
rums. For instance, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,'"' in holding that
employment discrimination claims must go to arbitration when there
is an arbitration clause in a contract, means that victims of discrimi-
nation in such circumstances have no access to any court. Addition-
ally, Alexander v. Sandoval° means that victims of practices with a ra-
cially discriminatory impact cannot use the Title VI regulations to sue
in federal or state court.
In this essay, I make three points. First, the decisions of last Term,
and recent years, reflect the Supreme Court's closing the courthouse
door to plaintiffs with civil rights claims. Second, there is a paradox:
the Supreme Court is exalting its own role at the very time that it is
showing disdain for the importance of access to other courts. Finally,
I want to examine what might be done to remedy this and restore ac-
cess to justice.
Ili 410 U .S. 113 (1973).
17 See, e.g., Younger v,. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (stating that federal courts may not enjoin
pending state court proceedings).
18 See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975) (both cases ruling that plaintiffs have standing only if they can prove that the defen-
dant was the cause of the injury and that a favorable court decision is likely to remedy the in-
jury).
19 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
20 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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I. THE Loss OF FAITH IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS
My central point is that there is a consistent and disturbing theme
to the Rehnquist Court's decisions in recent years: civil rights plain-
tiffs lose. The result has become strikingly predictable when the
Court hears cases under federal civil rights law. Almost invariably,
the plaintiff loses in a 5-4 decision, with the majority comprised of the
five most conservative Justices, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy,
and Clarence Thomas.
This trend might be overlooked because the Court has used a
number of different approaches to justify its conclusions and the
cases have involved several statutes. But the overall pattern is clear:
the Court's conservative majority almost always finds a way to rule
against civil rights plaintiffs and this is usually done by closing the
courthouse doors to litigants.
A. Closing the Courthouse Doors Based on Trust in the Political Process
Some cases have justified restricting access to the courts based on
a belief that the political process will adequately safeguard rights.
The most explicit statement of this was in Alden v. Maine, which held
that sovereign immunity broadly protects state governments from be-
ing sued in state court without their consent, even to enforce federal
laws.2  At oral argument in Alden, Solicitor General of the United
States Seth Waxman quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI and contended that suits against States are essential to
assure the supremacy of federal law.= Justice Kennedy's response to
this argument is astounding. He stated:
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in
its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to dis-
regard the Constitution or valid federal law. The States and their officers
are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal
statutes that comport with the constitutional design. We are unwilling to
assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the bind-
ing laws of the United States. The good faith of the States thus provides
an important assurance that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.' '
21 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
2r T anscript of Oral Arguments, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), available at 1999 U.S.
Trans Lexis 1, 11 (Mar. 31, 1999) (No. 98-436).
23 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-55 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2).
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What, then, is the assurance that state governments will comply
with federal law?: Trust in the good faith of state governments. Is it
possible to imagine that 30 or 40 years ago, at the height of the civil
rights movement, the Supreme Court would have issued such a
statement that state governments simply could be trusted to voluntar-
ily comply with federal law? James Madison said that if people were
angels there would be no need for a Constitution, but there would be
no need for a government, either.4 The reality is that state govern-
ments, intentionally or unintentionally, at times will violate federal
law. To rely on trust in the good faith of state governments is no as-
surance of complaince with federal law at all.
I regard this passage from Justice Kennedy as revealing a central
aspect of the Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions: there is no
need for access to the courts because the political process can be
trusted. In Alden, the Court said that both federal and state courts
are closed to plaintiffs seeking to enforce the Fair Labor Standards
Act against state governments.
Another, perhaps more subtle, example of the Supreme Court re-
stricting access to the courts based on trust in the political process is
Alexander v. Sandoval.26 The Court held that there is no private right
of action to enforce regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prevents recipients of federal funds from engaging in
practices that have a racially discriminatory impact.7 Regulations
adopted under Title VI prohibit practices with racially discriminatory
effect. The importance of these regulations cannot be overstated.
The Supreme Court has held that violations of equal protection re-
211quire proof of discriminatory purpose.
The Title VI regulations are the key way of challenging actions
which disadvantage racial minorities when discriminatory purpose
cannot be proven. Since it is so difficult to prove discriminatory in-
tent, Title VI has been an enormously important weapon in civil
rights litigation.29 But the Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Sandoval, in
a 5-4 decision, ruled that no lawsuits can be brought under these
regulations. This means that civil rights plaintiffs have lost a key
24 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
25 To be accurate, this is not a complete closure of the courthouse. State officers still can be
sued for injunctive relief and the federal government still can sue States. But that does not di-
minish the importance of Alden. The Court's holding means that generally a State cannot be
stied in federal or state court when it violates federal law.
26 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
27 Id. at 293.
2, See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976).
29 See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir.
2001);Jersey leights Neighborhood Assoc. v. Clendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999).
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weapon for challenging practices that have a racially discriminatory
impact.
Notably, the Court, injustice Scalia's majority opinion, did not in-
validate the Title VI regulations, though he did say that their validity
was an open question to be considered on another occasion." In-
stead, the Court assumed the validity of the regulations and ruled
that no lawsuits can be brought to enforce them. How, then, are the
Title VI regulations to be enforced? The only way is if the political
branches of government are willing to cutoff funds to recipients who
engage in practices with a racially disparate effect. Once more, the
Court is denying access to the judiciary and leaving enforcement of
civil rights to the political branches of government.
Likewise, in the just-completed Term, in Gonzaga University v.
Doe," the Court held that the provisions of the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 2 which restrict educational
institutions from releasing information about their students, cannot
be enforced through a private right of action or via a Section 1983
suit.3'3 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that since the
law was adopted by Congress under its spending power, it could not
be enforced via litigation. ' Like in Alexander v. Sandoval, ensuring
compliance will depend on the willingness of the political branches
to enforce the law's requirements by cutting off funds to offending
institutions. The unquestionable value of litigation in deterring viola-
tions and providing a remedy to victims was never recognized by the
Court.
B. Closing the Courthouse Doors in Favor of Arbitration
There has been an important trend in recent years towards busi-
nesses insisting on arbitration clauses in contracts. This is common
in many areas, such as employment and health care. Frequently,
these clauses are written in broad terms and leave the other party to
the contract no alternative but to forego access to the courts.
Last year, at the time I was teaching these cases in Civil Procedure,
I purchased a new computer. The documentation accompanying the
computer had a clause which said that I consented to arbitration for
any claims that I had against the company. As a "class project," I
wrote a letter to the computer company refusing consent to this pro-
.0 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-83.
31 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
32 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2003).
313 Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279.
34 Id. at 2273-74.
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vision. Moreover, I said that by reading my letter they consented that
I could sue them in court. I still have not received a response.
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would be receptive to such
an effort. The Court has very aggressively enforced arbitration
clauses even when it means that those with civil rights claims are de-
nied access to the courts. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,35 involved
an employee of a Circuit City store in California who sued the com-
pany in state court under state discrimination laws. His employment
contract included a clause providing for arbitration of employment-
related disputes. Circuit City filed a lawsuit in federal district court,
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, to compel arbitration.
The Federal Arbitration Act has an exception for maritime and
other employment contracts in interstate commerce. 3 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the state law dis-
crimination claims had to go to arbitration and could not be litigated
in court.3' The Court broadly construed the Federal Arbitration Act
and narrowly interpreted its exception to apply only to employment
of transportation workers. The Court did not discuss, or even ac-
knowledge, the compelling public purpose in allowing victims of dis-
crimination to have access to the courts.
It should be noted, though, that in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,:" the
Court held that an arbitration clause does not preclude the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission from bringing a discrimina-
tion claim on behalf of an individual.' The Court explained that an
individual, via an arbitration clause, waives his or her right to sue, but
the person cannot waive the government's authority to bring an en-
forcement action. This is a significant ruling, but it does relatively lit-
tle to undercut the effect of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. The
EEOC's ability to sue on behalf of individuals is inherently limited by
scarce resources. The vast majority of employees with arbitration
clauses in their contracts will not have any meaningful access to the
courts when they are subjected to discrimination.
C. Closing the Courthouse Doors by Narrowing the Scope of Congress'Powers
When constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist Court,
undoubtedly they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional
law were in the area of federalism. In a series of important rulings,
many involving civil rights laws, the Court has narrowed the scope of
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
36 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
37 Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109.
38 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
39 Id. at 766.
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Congress' constitutional powers. The effect of many of these deci-
sions is to deny access to the courts to injured individuals.
For example, the Supreme Court dramatically restricted the scope
of Congress' powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Section Five authorizes Congress to enact laws to enforce the
Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, ° the Court held that Congress
may use this power to create new rights by statute, but it cannot re-
strict rights recognized by the courts. However, in City of Boerne v. Flo-
res,41 the Court implicitly overruled Katzenbach v. Morgan and held that
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress cannot
create new rights or expand the scope of rights. Congress' power is
limited to enacting laws to prevent and remedy violations of rights,
and these statutes must be narrowly tailored so as to be "proportion-
ate" and "congruent" to the problem." In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Court declared unconstitutional the federal Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, a key civil rights law, that passed almost unanimously
through Congress, to expand the protections for free exercise of re-
43
The Court also has narrowed the scope of Congress' Section Five
power by ruling that it may be used only to regulate state and local
governments but not private conduct. In the Civil Rights Cases,44 the
Court decided that Congress, under Section Five, was limited to
adopting laws regulating state and local government actions. But in
several more recent cases, such as United States v. Guest,45 a majority of
the Justices said that Congress could use its Section Five powers to
prevent private violations of civil rights.
In United States v. Morrison," the Court overruled cases like Guest
and held that Congress under Section Five cannot regulate private
behavior. In Morrison, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, invali-
dated an important civil rights law: the provision of the Violence
Against Women Act that authorized suits by victims of gender moti-
vated violence. The Court held that Congress lacked the power un-
der both Section Five and the Commerce Clause to enact such a law.
Many other civil rights statutes are likely to be vulnerable to constitu-
tional challenge as a result of Morrison's narrow reading of Congress'
powers.
40 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
41 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
42 Id. at 520.
43 Id. at 536.
44 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
46 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
47 Id. at 627.
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The effect of this decision is to deny injured individuals access to
the courthouse. The provision of the Violence Against Women Act
declared unconstitutional in Morrison ensured that victims of gender-
motivated violence, rape, and domestic abuse would be able to sue.
The Court closed the courthouse door to these individuals. Another
effect of the Supreme Court's narrowing the scope of Congress' pow-
ers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is in barring
suits under federal civil rights laws against state governments. For ex-
ample, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 4  the Court ruled that state
governments cannot be sued for age discrimination in violation of
the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In Board of Trus-
tees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,4'' the Court held that state
governments may not be sued for employment discrimination in vio-
lation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Both cases were decided by 5-4 margins and used the same reason-
ing. The Court held that Congress may authorize suits against states
and override sovereign immunity only pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said that under City of Boerne v.
Flores, Congress cannot expand the scope of rights under Section Five
and that each of these laws does just that by prohibiting more than
the Constitution forbids. Both cases are very much about closing the
courthouse doors to victims of discrimination. The Supreme Court
did not declare unconstitutional the substantive provisions of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Instead, what the Court did was to limit their enforcement by
barring suits against state governments.
D. Narrowly Interpreting Civil Rights Laws
The Court also has precluded access to the courts by adopting
very restrictive interpretations of federal civil rights laws. For exam-
ple, in 1999 the Court held that under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, a disability does not exist if the condition has been corrected. In
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,5" the Court ruled that individuals whose
vision has been corrected so that it does not interfere with major life
activities do not have a disability within the meaning of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act. Therefore, the failure to hire them based
on their impaired vision does not violate the Act. Likewise, in Murphy
v. United Parcel Service, Inc.," the Court held that determination of
whether an individual's physical or mental impairment substantially
48 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
49 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Ws 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
5' 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
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limits a major life activity so as to satisfy the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act's definition of "disability" must take into consideration medi-
cation or other corrective devices that mitigate the individual's im-
pairment.
These rulings make it permissible, for example, for an employer
to refuse to hire a person with epilepsy or diabetes if these conditions
are under control with medication; the Court says that the correction
means that there is no disability for purposes of the Act. Of course, if
the condition is not under control, then the employer can refuse to
hire on that basis.
The Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams, continues the pattern of restrictive interpretations of
the law. 2 The Court held that an impairment which prevents an in-
dividual from performing some job tasks is not a disability unless it
"prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people's daily lives.' Specifically,
the Court ruled that a plaintiffs proof that she could not perform
repetitive work with her hands and arms was not a disability because
it was not demonstrated that it substantially limited her in a major life
activity.
Williams will unquestionably create an additional obstacle for
many plaintiffs in disability cases. Individuals, like Williams, who have
a medical condition that interferes with some job tasks, but not oth-
ers, will find it difficult to prevail. More generally, Williams adopts a
very restrictive definition of disability, requiring a substantial impair-
ment of a major life activity. Work alone does not appear to be suffi-
cient; Williams could not work at her assigned job, but the Court did
not regard her as disabled.
But the problem with the Court's analysis is that disability always
must be assessed relative to particular tasks. Obviously, a key purpose
of the Americans with Disabilities Act was to end workplace discrimi-
nation against the disabled. The focus of Title I of the Act is prohib-
iting such discrimination and requiring that employers make reason-
able accommodations for disabilities. From this perspective, work
certainly should be regarded as a major life activity and an impair-
ment that interferes with work should be regarded as a disability.
Moreover, the Court's approach makes the determination of what
is a disability inherently subjective. Courts have great discretion in
deciding what is a major life activity or what is a substantial enough
interference to constitute a disability. Unfortunately, the Court, and
52 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
5.4 Id. at 198.
54 Id. at 200-01.
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many lower courts, use this discretion primarily against plaintiffs.
The result is to close the courthouse doors to many civil rights plain-
tiffs.
E. Eliminating Incentives to Litigation and Creating Disincentives
The above techniques of closing the courthouse door have in-
volved the Supreme Court precluding all access. The Court also rules
against civil rights plaintiffs by eliminating incentives to litigation and
creating obstacles which are a disincentive to suits.
An example of the former is the Supreme Court's important rul-
ing in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources, where the Court made it much more
difficult for successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees5"' The
availability of attorneys' fees under civil rights statutes is a major in-
centive for suits. The reality is that without this incentive, it would be
far more difficult to enforce civil rights laws.
Buckhannon involved a challenge to state regulations under several
federal statutes, including the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. There was protracted litigation and ultimately
the state voluntarily changed its policy and adopted what the plain-
tiffs had been seeking through their suit. The plaintiffs then sought
attorneys' fees on the grounds that they had been the catalyst for the
suit. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected this and held
that a plaintiff is not deemed to "prevail" just because his or her law-
suit is the "catalyst" for the government to change its policy:"  Attor-
neys' fees are to be awarded only when there is a judicial action-a
judgment or consent decree-in favor of the plaintiff.
The result is that a defendant can preclude a deserving plaintiff
from recovering attorneys fees simply by changing policies before a
verdict. Reducing the chances of attorneys' fees in this way will re-
move a crucial incentive to litigation in many cases and effectively
close the courthouse door in many civil rights cases.
An example of the Court creating a disincentive to litigation is the
Supreme Court's decision in Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minne-
sota.7 The Court imposed a significant restriction on supplemental
jurisdiction in suits against state governments and thus created an ob-
stacle to litigation of civil rights claims. The law of federal court ju-
risdiction long has allowed a federal court to hear state law claims
that arise from the same facts as federal law claims properly before
the federal court. For example, in United Mine Workers of America v.
55 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
56 Id. at 610.
57 534 U.S. 533 (2002).
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Gibbs,"' the Court ruled that federal courts hearing federal question
claims may decide state law claims, even though not otherwise in
their jurisdiction, if they "derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact." ' Pendent jurisdiction was a well established judicially created
doctrine.
In 1990, Congress revised the jurisdictional statutes expressly to
authorize federal courts hearing such suits. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 creates supplemental jurisdiction and essentially codifies the
prior law into statute."' Section 1367(d) addresses a common sense,
practical problem: if the federal court ends up dismissing a case be-
cause the federal questions are not viable, in many cases the statute of
limitations will have run in the meantime on the state claims, thus
precluding them from being filed in state court. Section 1367(d)
thus provides that the statute of limitations on the state claims "shall
be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after
it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period."' '
The issue in Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota was
whether this provision is constitutional when the claims are against a
state government. Lance Raygor and James Goodchild sued the Uni-
versity of Minnesota in federal court for age discrimination. They al-
leged a violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967,62 and of state anti-discrimination laws. In January 2000,
while their case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents,"" and held that state governments cannot be
sued for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
without their consent.(A
The federal district court then exercised its discretion under Sec-
tion 1367 to dismiss Raygor's and Goodchild's suit because all that
remained was state law claims. Raygor and Goodchild filed suit in
state court under state law, but the state moved to dismiss contending
that the statute of limitations had expired in the meantime. Raygor
and Goodchild pointed to Section 1367(d), which tolled the statute
of limitations while the claims were pending in federal court. The
Minnesota Supreme Court, though, declared this provision unconsti-
tutional, concluding that Congress constitutionally could not toll the
statute of limitations on state claims in state court.
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed. Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote for the Court and emphasized that "with respect
18 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
59 Id. at 725.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
61 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2000).
62 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
6 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
64 Id. at 92.
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to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts... a State 'may pre-
scribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued.""
'
,(;
5
Justice O'Connor said that Section 1367(d) does not clearly state that
it was meant to apply to claims against state governments. She there-
fore concluded that to avoid serious constitutional questions the
Court would interpret Section 1367(d) to not apply to state claims
filed against a state government in state court.
From a practical perspective, this case is very troubling in terms of
the choices it will pose for litigants. A lawyer having both federal and
state law claims will have several options, none desirable. One ap-
proach would be to file both the federal and state claims in state
court and forego federal court entirely. This, of course, undermines
the availability of federal courts and is especially undesirable in areas
where the federal court is perceived as more hospitable to civil rights
claims than the state court. Another possibility would be to file suit
in both federal court and state court, or at least to file in state court
right before the statute of limitations on the state courts is about to
run. This is certainly permissible, but the problem is that whichever
court decides first, federal or state, will completely preclude the other
from deciding the matter. Resjudicata-claim preclusion-will apply
once one court renders a decision.
Thus, the effect of Raygor is to undermine the availability of fed-
eral courts to hear federal claims. This is particularly troubling be-
cause it is based on a principle-that sovereign immunity protects
states from being sued in state court-that has no foundation in the
Constitution's text, history, or even precedents before a few years
ago.
F. Broadly Interpreting Statutes which Close the Courthouse Doors
The Court also has closed the courthouse doors by very expan-
sively interpreting statutes that preclude access to the judiciary. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,'3'  requires that prisoner's ex-
haust administrative remedies before bringing suits in court concern-
ing prison conditions. Specifically, it states: "No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions.., by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administra-
tive remedies as are available are exhausted.,
67
65 Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (quoting Beers v. Ar-
kansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003).
67 Id.
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Porter v. Nussl? posed the question of whether this exhaustion re-
quirement applies to a prisoner's claim for excessive force by prison
authorities. Ronald Nussle, an inmate in a Connecticut prison, filed
suit in federal court charging that corrections officers subjected him
to a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ruled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's
exhaustion requirement did not apply because it concerns com-
plaints about general conditions in the prison, not single incidents of
excessive force.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Second Circuit and
held that a prisoner must exhaust the prison grievance procedure for
all claims, whether they involve a particular instance or general con-
ditions.! The Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, expansively
interpreted "conditions" and the exhaustion requirement in the law.
The result is that prisoners will be delayed in getting to court and the
procedural hurdles may keep some from getting there at all.
This is the second time in the last year that the Court has broadly
interpreted the exhaustion requirement in the PLRA. In Booth v.
Churner"' the Court held that a prisoner seeking monetary relief must
exhaust administrative procedures, even if they cannot provide any
money damages, so long as they can provide something to benefit the
prisoner. Together, Porter v. Nussle and Booth v. Churner interpret the
exhaustion requirement extremely expansively and effectively close
the courthouse door to many prisoners.
II. THE IRONY: THE COURT EXALTS ITS OWN ROLE WHILE SHOWING
LITTLE RESPECT FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS
Perhaps the techniques and cases described above can be under-
stood as a reflection of a Supreme Court with a very limited view of
the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society. The problem
with this interpretation is that it does not fit with how the Court has
defined its own role. This is a Supreme Court that defers to no one:
not Congress, not administrative agencies, not state legislatures, and
not state courts. The paradox is that in the last decade, the Supreme
Court has very much exalted its own role, while showing little respect
for the importance of access to other courts.
For example, the Rehnquist Court has declared federal laws un-
constitutional at a much faster rate than either the Warren or Burger
68 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
9 Id. at 532.
70 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
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Courts.7' In the last decade, the Court has struck down major federal
laws limiting the scope of Congress' commerce power,72 restricting
Congress' authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,73 using the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on Congress,
74
and denying Congress the ability to authorize suits against state gov-
ernments.75
Most revealing have been the Court's decisions limiting the scope
of Congress' powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In a series of decisions beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores,7b
the Court has held that Congress under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment cannot expand the scope of rights. Rather, Con-
gress can only enact laws to prevent or remedy violations of rights
recognized by the courts and these laws must be "proportionate" and
"congruent" to the violations.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, for example, the Court struck down a
federal statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, that ex-
panded the safeguards accorded to the free exercise of religion.7
The Act was adopted in 1993 to overturn a recent Supreme Court de-
cision that had narrowly interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith."' Oregon law prohibited the consumption of pe-
yote, a hallucinogenic substance. Native Americans challenged this
law claiming that it infringed free exercise of religion because their
religious rituals required the use of peyote. Under prior Supreme
71 SeeSeth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C.L. REV'. 1073, 1074-75 (2001) ("Since 1995,
the Court has invalidated twenty-six different federal enactments, and its pending merits docket
includes several other constitutional challenges to federal statutes.").
72 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil damages
provision in the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (in-
validating the Gun Free School Zone Act as exceeding the scope of Congress' commerce
power).
73 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as exceeding the scope of Congress' Section Five powers).
74 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the Brady Handgun
Control Act as violating the Tenth Amendment); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (invalidating provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act as violating the Tenth
Amendlment).
75 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding the ADEA's abrogation of
the states' sovereign immunity exceeded Congress' authority tinder Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sa'. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) (holding Congress' atempt to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity with the Pat-
ent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act is unconstitutional); Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding Congress lacks power to abrogate states' sovereign im-
intmnity tinder the Indian Commerce Clause).
76 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
77 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4 (2003)
(hereinafter "RFRA").
78 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Court precedents, government actions burdening religion would be
upheld only if they were necessary to achieve a compelling govern-
ment purpose. ' The Supreme Court, in Smith, changed the law and
held that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be used to challenge neu-
tral laws of general applicability. The Oregon law prohibiting con-
sumption of peyote was deemed neutral because it was not motivated
by a desire to interfere with religion and it was a law of general appli-
cability because it applied to everyone.
In response to this decision, in 1993, Congress overwhelmingly
adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was signed
into law by President Clinton. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act was express in stating that its goal was to overturn Smith and re-
store the test that was followed before that decision. The Act requires
courts considering free exercise challenges, including to neutral laws
of general applicability, to uphold the government's actions only if
they are necessary to achieve a compelling purpose. Specifically,
RFRA prohibited "[g] overnment" from "substantially burden [ing]" a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the
burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
'" °
The Court declared RFRA unconstitutional and held that Con-
gress is limited to enacting laws that prevent or remedy violations of
rights already recognized by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the
Court said that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.""'
Justice Kennedy defended this conclusion by invoking the need to
preserve the Court as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitu-
tion. Justice Kennedy quoted Marbury v. Madison and wrote:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be "superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means." It would be "on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts ... alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.'
'
8
Justice Kennedy concluded this part of the majority opinion by de-
claring: "Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution
71) See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding state act which abridged appel-
lant's right to free excercise of her religion was unconstitutional tinder the First Amendment).
RFRA, spra note 77, §§ 2000bb-3.
81 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
82 /d. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment
process contained in Article V.,,
3
This tremendously exalts the Court's role relative to Congress.
Rather than hold that both Congress and the Court can expand the
scope of constitutional rights, Boerne clearly holds that it is only for
the Supreme Court to do so.
Nor is this a Court that defers to state legislatures or state courts.
Although the Rehnquist Court purports to be concerned with feder-
alism, it frequently finds that state laws are preempted by federal
law.8 4 The Rehnquist Court's use of federalism has been entirely
about limiting Congress' powers, not about empowering state and lo-
cal governments generally.
The Court's unwillingness to defer to state courts is, of course,
best illustrated by its decision in Bush v. Gore.5 The Supreme Court's
per curiam opinion made two arguments. First, counting the un-
counted votes without standards violates equal protection."'! Second,
Florida law prevents the counting from continuing past December
12." This second point is indispensable to the Court's decision to
end the counting. Assuming that there were inequalities in the
counting that violated the Constitution, there were two ways to rem-
edy this: count none of the uncounted ballots or count all of the bal-
lots with uniform standards. The latter would involve remanding the
case to the Florida Supreme Court for development of standards and
for such relief as that court deemed appropriate.
It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court did not hold that
federal law prevented the counting from continuing. The only rea-
son for not remanding the case-as Justices Souter and Breyer ar-
gued for""-was the Court's judgment that Florida law prevented this.
In two paragraphs near the end of the per curiam opinion, the Court
explains why it is stopping the counting:
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the
State's electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process," as
provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5 .... That statute, in turn, requires that any con-
troversy or contest that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of
electors be completed by December 12. That date is upon us, and there
is no recount procedure in place under the State Supreme Court's order
that comports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it is evi-
dent that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be un-
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
95 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
86 Id. at 104-05.
87 Id. at 110.
88 Id. at 129.
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constitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems
with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a
remedy .... The only disagreement is as to the remedy .... Because the
Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature intended to
obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5,Justice Breyer's proposed
remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a
constitutionally proper contest under December 18-contemplates ac-
tion in violation of the Florida Election Code, and hence could not be
part of an "appropriate" order authorized by FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001)."
This is recited at length to show that the sole reason the Court
gave for ending the counting was based on its interpretation of Flor-
ida law. However, no Florida statute stated or implied that the count-
ing had to be done by December 12. The sole authority for the Su-
preme Court's conclusion was one statement by the Florida Supreme
Court.
However, that statement was made in a very different context and
when the Florida Supreme Court was not faced with the issue posed
by the Supreme Court's ruling. After the Supreme Court decided on
December 12 that the counting without standards violated equal pro-
tection, the issue was what remedy was appropriate under Florida law:
continue the counting past December 12 or end the counting to
meet the December 12 deadline. The Supreme Court could not pos-
sibly know how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve this issue
because it never had occurred before. Prior Florida decisions em-
phasized the importance of making sure that every vote is accurately
counted.0 The Florida Supreme Court might have relied on this to
continue the counting past December 12. Alternatively, the Florida
Supreme Court might have ended the counting, treating December
12 as a firm deadline in Florida.
Indeed, after Bush v. Gore was decided, the Florida Supreme Court
issued a decision dismissing the case." Justice Shaw, in a concurring
opinion, declared:
[I]n my opinion, December 12 was not a "drop-dead" date under Florida
law. In fact, I question whether any date prior toJanuary 6 is a drop-dead
date under the Florida election scheme. December 12 was simply a per-
missive "safe-harbor" date to which the states could aspire. It certainly was
not a mandatory contest deadline under the plain language of the Florida
92
Election Code ....
19 (d. at 110-11.
90 See, e.g., Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
91 Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000).
I,2 d. at 528-29 (emphasis in original).
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Perhaps a majority of the Florida Supreme Court would have fol-
lowed this view, perhaps not. The point is that this was a question of
Florida law to be decided by the Florida Supreme Court. It, of
course, is clearly established that state supreme courts get the final
word as to the interpretation of state law. In Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, in 1875, the Supreme Court held that it could review only ques-
tions of federal law and that the decisions of the state's highest court
are final on questions of state law!' The Court explained that Section
25 of the Judiciary Act was based on a belief that the Supreme Court
must be available to ensure state compliance with the United States
Constitution, but that there was no indication that Congress intended
the Court to oversee state court decisions as to state law matters.!4
From a federalism perspective, it is inexplicable why the five Jus-
tices in the majority-usually the advocates of states' rights on the
Court-did not remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court to de-
cide under Florida law whether the counting should continue. The
Supreme Court impermissibly usurped the Florida Supreme Court's
authority to decide Florida law in this extraordinary case. The point
is that this is a Court that exalts its own role, while closing access to
other courts.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THIS?
There are no obvious or easy solutions precisely because the Su-
preme Court gets the last word and because it has been so consis-
tently hostile to civil rights plaintiffs. But there are avenues for re-
opening the courthouse doors to civil rights litigants.
First, federal legislation can remedy many of the recent Supreme
Court decisions. Obviously, constitutional decisions cannot be over-
ruled by statute. But many of the recent rulings have been constru-
ing federal statutes, not the Constitution. For example, Congress, by
statute, could amend Title VI to overcome Alexander v. Sandoval and
allow suits to enforce the regulations which prohibit recipients of
federal funds from engaging in practices with a racially discrimina-
tory impact. The Federal Arbitration Act could be amended to over-
rule Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams and provide that employment dis-
crimination cases can be litigated, rather than arbitrated, even where
there are contractual provisions calling for arbitration. Congress
could revise the attorneys' fees laws to nullify Buckhannon and specify
that plaintiffs who are the catalyst for action are the prevailing party.
Congress even could try to overcome some of the recent sovereign
933 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
94 Id. at 611.
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immunity decisions by documenting a pattern of state discrimination
against the elderly and the disabled.
Yet, such legislation has not been passed. Why not? At other
times, Congress has acted to overturn Supreme Court decisions
which narrowly interpreted federal civil rights statutes. In part, the
answer may be political. Republicans have controlled the House of
Representatives since 1994 and were the majority in the Senate until
2001. Advancing civil rights obviously is not a part of the Republican
agenda.
But there is another, more subtle explanation for the congres-
sional inactivity. The Supreme Court's decisions described in this
paper have been primarily procedural in nature. It is much more dif-
ficult to interest the public, and therefore Congress, in laws about as-
pects of jurisdiction and court procedure. Buckhannon may be vitally
important to civil rights litigants, but it is not a ruling that will get
headlines. Supplemental jurisdiction does not engage the media's
attention. A significant obstacle to legislative solutions is the compli-
cated and procedural nature of the rulings.
Second, state legislatures can act in many of these areas. Some
states have enacted laws waiving their sovereign immunity with re-
spect to discrimination suits."" Some have adopted or are considering
their own versions of the Violence Against Women Act.'
7
The primary problem with this is that it will require actions of fifty
state legislatures, which is much more difficult than persuading one
federal legislature, Congress, to act. The reality, of course, is that
even a concerted effort at state legislation will leave many citizens, in
many states that don't act, without protections. Also, in some areas,
state governments cannot provide an effective remedy. For instance,
the Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, re-
quiring arbitration of discrimination claims, was based on an inter-
pretation of the Federal Arbitration Act and thus cannot be over-
come by state legislation."
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there must be a major ef-
fort to block conservative judicial nominees for the federal courts.
The decisions described throughout this paper are a product of con-
servative judicial ideology. The composition of the courts is thus de-
terminative of whether this trend will continue and even become
qr See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (extending the broad right to make and enforce contracts,
sue, and receive the full benefit of all laws and proceedings to all citizens).
96 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001 (2003); FLA. STAT. chs. 760.01, 768.28 (2002); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 344.020, 344.450 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (2002);
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 297 (McKinney 20103).
0 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (West 2003).
99 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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much worse. It is essential that the Senate force President Bush to
pick moderates, rather than conservatives for the federal bench.
CONCLUSION
This is a difficult time for civil rights plaintiffs. Velazquez was an
important victory, but it was atypical. In Velazquez, the Court recog-
nized the importance of access to the courts and struck down a provi-
sion of federal law that prohibited attorneys receiving federal Legal
Services funds from challenging welfare laws. But in countless other
decisions, the Court has done just the opposite, failing to recognize
the need for access to the courts.
In his wonderful commentary to this paper at the conference at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, David Rudovsky rightly
pointed out that civil rights suits are still being filed and that they of-
ten still succeed. 99 Although this is true, the reality is that it has be-
come increasingly difficult and the future threatens to make this
worse. Concerted efforts are essential now, such as in legislation by
Congress and state governments and in blocking conservative judicial
nominees. The future of civil rights litigation depends on it.
i David R. Rudovsky, Civil Rights Litigation: The Current Paradox, 5 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 487
(2003).
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